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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAw-Fourth Amendment-"Mere
Evidence Rule"-The distinction between instrumentalities, contraband,
fruits of the crime and evidentiary objects has been abolished and eviden-
tiary objects may now be searched for and seized if the search is reason-
able and if the officers have probable cause to believe that such seizure
will lead to apprehension or conviction.
Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642 (1967).
Petitioner was tried for armed robbery of a cab company office. He was
followed from the office by two drivers who saw him enter a house. The
two men notified police who entered the house, arrested the petitioner in
an upstairs bedroom and seized a shotgun and pistol found in the bed-
room; ammunition was found in the bedroom. Another officer found the
clothing of the peitioner in the washing machine in the basement. Hayden
was convicted in a non-jury trial in the Criminal Court of Baltimore. The
guns, ammunition and clothing were admitted at the trial, petitioner
having made no objection to their admission. Hayden did not appeal but
did petition for relief under the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure
Act' asserting for the first time the illegality of the forcible entry and
search of his home.2 This petition was denied without hearing testimony.
Petitioner appealed this decision and the Maryland Court of Appeals
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing stating that the denial of
post conviction relief could not be based on the fact that the petitioner
had not raised the issue of "illegal search and seizure, and consequent
arrest without a warrant" 3 at the trial. The post conviction judge decided
that Mrs. Hayden "gave the police permission to enter the home"4 and
that the search was reasonable. Petitioner again appealed to the Maryland
Court of Appeals but withdrew the application and filed this habeas
corpus proceeding. The United States District Court held the search and
seizure valid.' Petitioner appealed this decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit where a three judge panel re-
versed the District court, one judge dissenting.6 Majority and dissenting
opinions stated that the entry and arrest were lawful because the officers
1. MD. STAT. ANN. art. 27, § 645A (Supp, 1966).
2. Hayden v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 233 Md. 613, 195 A.2d 692 (1963).
3. Id.
4. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645 & n.4 (1967). Note
4 points out that the federal habeas corpus court did not believe that Mrs. Hayden's
permission was needed undei the circumstances.
S. Brief for Appellant at 4, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S. Ct. 1642
(1967).
6. 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966).
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were in "hot pursuit."7 The majority held that the search was a reason-
able one, stating that it "did not exceed the broad limits tolerated in
Harris v. United States, . . . where the Supreme Court affirmed the
validity of an intensive five-hour search of all four rooms of an apartment
... incident to a lawful arrest."8 The dissent did not dispute this point.
All three judges agreed that the guns were properly seized .and hence
admissible but differed as to whether the clothing was admissible, the
majority believing the clothing to be "mere evidence" as defined in
Gouled v. United States9 and subsequent cases and hence inadmissible
under the Fourth Amendment.' ° The dissent pointed out the lack of logic
in immunizing the clothing upon being removed as "mere evidence.""
The dissent would have allowed the clothing to be admitted on the basis
that Hayden disrobed in order to avoid detection. The fact that the cloth-
ing might have been a means used to conceal the identity of the man who
committed the crime caused the dissent to conclude that the majority
erred in deciding that clothing may not be seized unless the person is
wearing it at the time of arrest (i.e., that upon disrobing, the clothing
previously worn was immediately transformed into "mere evidence").
The state of Maryland successfully petitioned for certiorari alleging that
the "mere evidence rule" as professed in Gouled is not properly a basis for
logical distinction and that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only un-
reasonable searches and seizures.
In Gouled federal officials, with a search warrant, seized papers which
tended to show that the defendants had bribed a government official. The
defendants were indicted on two counts; (1) conspiracy to defraud the
United States, and (2) fraudulent use of the mail. The court held the
papers inadmissible stating that search warrants "may not be used as a
means of gaining access to a man's house or office and papers solely for
the purpose of making a search to secure evidence to be used against him
in a criminal or penal proceeding. .".'."" The "mere evidence rule" held
that materials of purely evidential value could not be seized by federal
officials, even though pursuant to a valid search or incident to a lawful
arrest. According to Gouled the only proper objects of a search and
seizure were instrumentalities, contraband, and fruits of the crime.'3
7. Id. at 651. The "hot pursuit" exception to the "mere evidence rule" is justified on
the ground that in order to prevent complete concealment of a crime by the destruction of
evidence an officer may seize the object if the accused has immediate control over the
object or if it is on his person. See United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir.
1926) and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8. Id.
9. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
10. Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958), United States v. Lerner,
100 F. Supp. 765 (1951), United States v. Richmond, 57 F. Supp. 903 (1944).
11. 363 F.2d at 656.
12. 255 U.S. at 309.
13. Id.
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The Gouled court cited as the historical basis for the "mere evidence
rule" Boyd v. United States.14 In this excise tax evasion case (which was
civil in form, but criminal in nature), E. A. Boyd and Son were compelled
to produce, by federal statute, "any business book, invoice, or paper for
inspection." The court held that such "suits for penalties and forfeitures
... are of.. . quasi-criminal nature, ... they are within ... the purpose of
the Fourth Amendment ... and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares . . .,1" the right against self-incrimination. By reading
the Fourth and Fifth Amendment together, the search for evidence was
found unreasonable and its introduction into evidence was held to violate
the defendant's right against self-incrimination, the court equating the
seizure with a "forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testi-
mony. .... )716
In Hayden the petitioner claimed and the court agreed that the "mere
evidence rule" has been a great source of confusion." The primary sources
of this confusion were the lack of a definitive rationale in Gouled and the
problem of disinguishing evidentiary objects from those which were ad-
missible. Two main theories have been used to substantiate the "mere
evidence rule": the property theory and the privacy theory. The property
theory was based on traditional concepts of title and possession. The
seizure of property under this theory was based on the proposition that
title had been forfeited and the right to possession terminated. Although
this property theory was adequate for contraband and fruits, where title
was not in the possessor, it would not apply to instrumentalities, for
possession of them was usually lawful.' 8 The court in Hayden criticized
the property theory and stated: "the principal object of the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property ... .
Fruits and contraband may be seized when the privacy right to have the
object secure is no longer a worthy matter of such protection. Although
privacy is invaded when instrumentalities are seized, the courts have
decided that it is better to inconvenience the individual than to allow
these instrumentalities to remain in his possession.2" The danger to the
public appears to be the primary consideration of the courts in so decid-
14. 116 U.S. 616 (1885). This opinion was written by Mr. Justice Bradley with Mr.
Justice Miller and the Chief Justice concurring. For an in depth study of this case see:
Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEo. L.J. 593 (1966).
15. Id. at 634.
16. Id. at 630.
17. 87 S. Ct. at 1651.
18. State v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 269, 273 P.2d 392, 400 (1962). See comment, Limita-
tions on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects: A Rule in Search oj a Reason, 20 U. CmI. L. REV.
319, 322-23 (1953), and Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 Gao.
L.J. 593, 622 (1966).
19. 87 S. Ct. at 1648.
20. Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidentiary" Objects: A Rule in Search of a
Reason, 20 U. CH. L. REv. 319, 327 (1953).
[Vol. 6:60
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ing for if the means used to perpetrate the crime were allowed to remain
in the possession of the accused the peril evidenced by the crime would
continue.
The confusion over classifying materials as evidentiary or not is evident
in Marron v. United States 1 and United States v. Lejkowitz.22 In Marron,
a case involving violation of the prohibition statute, utility bills were said
to be instrumentalities and thus admissible. In Lefkowitz, also involving a
prohibition violation, utility bills were held inadmissible as "mere evi-
dence." In Morrison v. United States,3 a case in which defendant was
charged with a perverted sexual act, traces of seminal fluid in a handker-
chief were held inadmissible; but shoes were considered an "instru-
mentality" of a robbery in United States v. Guido24 and were thus admis-
sible. In Hayden the Supreme Court attempted to eliminate this confusion
by holding that: "We today reject the distinction [between instrumental-
ities and evidentiary objects] as based on premises no longer accepted as
rules governing the application of the Fourth Amendment."2
Commenting on the privacy theory basis of the "mere evidence rule"
the majority stated: "privacy is disturbed no more by a search directed
to a purely evidentiary object than it is"by a search directed to an instru-
mentality, fruit, or contraband."26 The majority stated that the privacy
guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment is still safeguarded by the fact
that a magistrate's approval is required before a search warrant can be
issuedIT
Despite the abolition of the "mere evidence rule" the majority still had
to consider petitioner's argument that the introduction of the petitioner's
own clothing constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment. In reject-
ing this argument the majority relied on Schmerber v. California.28 In
Schmerber the defendant had blood taken from him against his will for
chemical analysis. The court held this did not violate the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination for the specimen was not testimonial
or communicative in nature.' In the present case the clothing was not
testimonial or communicative and did not compel the petitioner to be a
witness against himself. Thus this court did not open the door all the way.
While evidentiary objects are now the proper subject of a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment the object must still meet the
21. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
22. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
23. 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
24. 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950 (1958).
25. 87 S. Ct. at 1647.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 384 U.S. 757.
29. 87 S. Ct. at 1648.
1967-1968]
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Fifth Amendment requirement of being non-testimonial and non-com-
municative in nature.
While the Supreme Court in Hayden abandoned the Gouled distinction
(between "mere evidence" and fruits, contraband, and instrumentalities),
it did provide that searches for "mere evidence" must satisfy the follow-
ing conditions: (1)
There must, of course, be a nexus-automatically provided in
the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-between the
item to be seized and criminal behavior. Thus in the case of
"mere evidence," probable cause must be examined in terms of
cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction. In so doing, consideration of police
purposes will be required. 30
and (2) the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment.8
In the concurring opinion Mr. Justice Fortas, with whom Chief Justice
Warren concurs, stated that the repudiation of the "mere evidence rule"
was unnecessary and exceptions to it were sufficient to encompass this
case. Mr. Justice Fortas utilized the hot pursuit doctrine, stating that the
"identifying clothing worn . . .and seized during 'hot pursuit' is within
the spirit and intendment of the "hot pursuit" exception ..."I'
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the seizure of evidentiary
objects is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.33
In his dissent Douglas examined in detail the foundations of the Fourth
Amendment and pointed out that in the case of Entick v. Carrington,34
Lord Camden stated that seizure of evidence by probing searches violated
the legal principle that no man is obliged to accuse himself. 5
The dissent cited United States v. Poller36 for the philosophy of the
"mere evidence rule" that by limiting the ability of the government to
seize the quest would be limited . 7 It was thought that by preventing
searches for evidentiary objects the individual would be protected from
unwarranted invasions of his privacy. This, as the majority points out,
offers no greater protection of privacy since privacy is disturbed in a
30. Id. at 1650.
31. Id. at 1651. A search warrant must specifically designate what, where, from whom,
and on what grounds an object is to be searched for and seized, United States v. Gannon,
201 F. Supp. 68 (1961).
32. 87 S. Ct. at 1652, 1653. See note 7 supra, for an explanation of the "hot pursuit doc-
trine."
33. Id. at 1653.
34. 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
35. 87 S. Ct. at 1654.
36. 43 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930).
37. Id. at 914.
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search for any type of object. In Poller Mr. Justice Hand criticized the
''mere evidence rule" stating:
If the search is permitted at all, perhaps it does not make so
much difference what is taken away, since the officers will
ordinarily not be interested in what does not incriminate, and
there can be no sound policy in protecting what does. 8
It is clear that confusion in the application of the "mere evidence rule"
led to much criticism of it. Now, with the literal interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment in Hayden the confusion over instrumentalities,
fruits, contraband and "mere evidence" is eliminated. Perhaps an argu-
ment made by the petitioner, but which the court did not mention was a
policy reason for abandoning the "mere evidence rule.' 3 9 This argument
was that in Miranda v. Arizona4 ° the court encouraged the police to place
a heavier emphasis on scientific investigation, and if the ability to seize
evidentiary objects was limited, as it was prior to this case, much
scientific investigation would be frustrated. Thus this decision, logical
and sound in its own right, may also be an attempt to balance the rights
of the accused and the power of the police in the field of evidence and
investigation.
Robert A. Kelly
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH WA.wANTs---Health and Safety Inspec-
tions-The Fourth Amendment guarantees that a person may not be
convicted for refusing to consent to a health or safety inspection of his
residence or place of business to be made without a search warrant.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967). See v. City of
Seattle, 87 S. Ct. 1737 (1967).
In Camara v. Municipal Court petitioner was convicted for violating the
San Francisco Housing Code by refusing to permit an inspection of his
residence on two different occasions when no search warrant had been
issued.' Petitioner argued that the ordinance under which he was con-
38. Id.
39. Brief for Appellant at 38, 39, Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 87 S Ct.
1642 (1967).
40. 384 U.S. 463 (1966).
1. SAN FRANcIsco, CALIF., MuNi'cIAL CODE § 503; RIGHT TO ENTER BUILDING. Autho-
rized employees of the City departments or City agencies, so far as may be necessary for
the performance of their duties, shall, upon presentation of proper credentials, have the
right to enter, at reasonable times, any building, structure, or premises in the City to
perform any duty imposed. upon them by the Municipal Code. § 507 PENALTY FOR VIOLA-
TION. Any person, the owner or his authorized agent who violates, disobeys, omits, neglects,
or refuses to comply with, or who resists or opposes the execution ofany of the provisions
1967-1968]
